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The 1963 murder of President John F. Kennedy led to a reconsideration of the 1947 Presidential 
Succession Act, which mandated that the Speaker of the US House of Representatives was next 
in line to the vice president and the Senate president pro tempore was next in line to the Speaker. 
The new president, Lyndon B. Johnson, was only fifty-five when he took the oath of office on 
November 22, 1963, but he had a well-known heart condition that would end his life nine years 
later. Seated behind Johnson when he met with Congress was the soon-to-be seventy-two-year-
old House Speaker John W. McCormack (D-MA) and the eighty-six-year-old Senate president 
pro tempore Carl Hayden (D-AZ). The prospect of either elderly man succeeding to the 
presidency led Congress to pass the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, enabling it to fill vice presidential 
vacancies by congressional confirmation of presidential appointments. The amendment also 
provided for the presidency to be temporarily filled should the president announce his own 
temporary incapacity or lose the powers of the office if the Cabinet and Congress determined that 
the president was incapable of carrying out the duties of the office. The president may retain the 
office but those powers will go to the vice president as “Acting President.” The president may 
petition Congress to regain the powers and if Congress agrees that “no inability exists, ” the 
powers will be restored. This article explores the backstage drama surrounding the circumstances 
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The murder of John F. Kennedy, the nation’s thirty-fifth president at mid-day on the streets of 
Dallas, Texas, is a national wound that has never healed. Each year there are more outpourings of 
conspiracy theories intended to explain the inexplicable of how the most powerful man on earth, 
protected by the Secret Service, could be killed in broad daylight by a lone drifter with a mail-
order rifle. A Texas murder made a Texan president. 
One of the consequences of that event was the passage of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
formally known as the Presidential Succession and Disability Amendment. Section 4 of that 
amendment has been seized on as a constitutional means to terminate the presidency of Donald J. 
Trump, the nation’s forty-fifth president.1 That section allows a majority of the Cabinet to declare 
that the president is unable to discharge the duties of the office. At that time, the vice president 
becomes acting president and the declaration is referred to Congress, where a two-thirds vote in 
each chamber will lead to the president’s temporary loss of power while still remaining in office.2  
Though multiple contemporaneous articles try to explain all the “things to know” about the 
amendment, it is important to remember that the amendment’s initial purpose was to prevent John 
W. McCormack, the soon-to-be seventy-two-year-old Speaker of the House, from becoming 
president. Its passage effectively voided the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, which placed 
the Speaker of the House directly behind the vice president in the line of succession.3 That goal 
was achieved with section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which enabled Congress in 1973 to 
fill the vice presidency with House minority leader Gerald R. Ford Jr. of Michigan to replace 
Vice President Spiro T. Agnew and, in 1974 when Vice President Ford replaced President 
Richard Nixon, to fill the vice presidency with New York governor Nelson A. Rockefeller. 
The 1947 act replaced the 1886 Presidential Succession Act, which removed the two senior 
congressional officers from the succession and placed Cabinet members behind the vice 
president.4 The 1886 act replaced the original Presidential Succession Act of 1792, which placed 
Figure 1. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s first address to 
Congress on November 27, 1963, with House Speaker John 
W. McCormack (D-MA) (left) and Senate president pro 




the Senate president pro tempore and the Speaker of the House directly behind the vice 
president.5 The 1886 act was passed in response to Charles Guiteau’s 1881 murder of President 
James Garfield. Guiteau intended to elevate Vice President Chester Arthur in order to advance his 
own political aspirations.6 With divided government occurring in nine of the eleven Congresses 
in the years 1875–1897, the potential for changing the partisan affiliation of the presidency 
through natural death or intentional murder was a genuine fear. By 1947 that fear had abated and 
the 1947 act restored the two congressional leaders to the top of the succession order but with 
their places reversed. It was President Harry Truman’s contention that elected leaders and not 
appointed ones should be next in line and that it could be “undemocratic” to allow a president to 
specify his own successor.7  
 
The 1963 Context 
A series of little-known events that occurred in the days following the Kennedy assassination are 
worthy of further examination. Reluctantly thrust into the middle of the confusion engulfing 
Washington at that time was Speaker John W. McCormack from the hard-edged Irish American 
ghetto of South Boston. Although Kennedy was also of Boston Irish Catholic descent, his 
background was of the well-born “lace curtain Irish.” The class differential complicated the 
family’s political relationships and, in the words of the matriarch Rose Kennedy, their two 
families interacted “usually as friends, sometimes as foes, sometimes friendly enemies.”8  
In the days before the assassination, McCormack had been in Boston to bury his brother 
Edward, a colorful South Boston barkeep known as “Knocko.” John McCormack returned to 
Washington on November 21, and the next day, at lunch in the House dining room, he received 
the news of Kennedy’s assassination from a reporter. Seated with two key aides, Martin Sweig 
and Edward Fitzgerald, McCormack suddenly became unsteady and, according to one eyewitness 
account: “[He] suffered a severe attack of dizziness. He started to rise, reeled, and began to lose 
consciousness. He raised a hand to his eyes, sank back in his seat and sat trembling.”9 He then 
declaimed, “My God . . . My God. What are we coming to?”10 
  
Protection Rejected 
Having voted for the 1947 act, McCormack realized immediately that he was now next in line to 
the presidency. Among other security concerns, it became a “burning issue of whether Speaker of 
the House McCormack [would be] receiving Secret Service protection as the constitutional 
successor to Lyndon Johnson.”11 John wanted no such protection, but would the choice be his? 
After hearing the news, McCormack returned to his office and met with Majority Leader 
Carl Albert and Armed Services chair Carl Vinson of Georgia, the chamber’s senior-most 
member. Albert and fellow Oklahoman US Representative Ed Edmondson, a former FBI agent, 
contacted the FBI’s Cartha DeLoach in the hope of obtaining protection for McCormack. In their 
initial request, they said that “utter confusion and hysteria reigned” in McCormack’s office. 
Edmondson then called Jim Rowley, the chief of the US Secret Service, to gain protection for 
McCormack. Sweig, McCormack’s administrative assistant, had already contacted the FBI 
requesting assistance, but the Secret Service and not the FBI was responsible for protection. Later 
that afternoon, two men knocked on McCormack’s door on the eighth floor at the Hotel 
Washington. They identified themselves as Secret Service men and told him that since he was 
now next in line to the presidency, he would receive their protection. 
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McCormack’s response, according to Drew Pearson, was blunt: “This is an intolerable 
intrusion in my private life and Mrs. McCormack’s and I won’t have it.”12 
The journalist Jim Bishop, a close wartime friend of McCormack’s older nephew John 
“Jocko” McCormack, described a similar response: 
The Speaker refused to admit the two men. He was brusque. It was not necessary for them 
to tell him he was the next man. He and Mrs. McCormack were averse to altering their 
private lives in the shadow of the Secret Service. He would not have these men 
accompany him in an automobile or stand over Mrs. McCormack in the shops. “Please,” 
he said softly as he could, “get out of the hall.”13 
Later, McCormack was driven to Andrews Air Force Base along with a motorcade of House 
members to await the arrival of Air Force One. He joined fellow dignitaries assembled at 
Andrews to meet the plane with its tragic cargo. The most distressed of those assembled was 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who bolted up the stairs to comfort his sister-in-law, the 
newly widowed Jacqueline Kennedy. Accounts vary, but it is reported that Bobby Kennedy 
barely looked at the new president and brushed past him in his effort to console Jackie.14 For two 
men like Lyndon Johnson and Bobby Kennedy who had a long history of distrust and acrimony, 
this moment was the exclamation point. 
 
Catastrophe Averted 
The crisis would have been worse had the early reports of Vice President Lyndon Johnson’s 
suffering a heart attack been true. While that rumor was untrue, there was a troubling account by 
Gerald Blaine, a member of the Secret Service’s “Kennedy Detail,” who described an incident 
outside Johnson’s Washington residence early on the morning of November 23. Johnson, whose 
tendency to urinate whenever and wherever the call of nature occurred, was nearly shot to death 
by an anxious Blaine, who had his Thompson submachine gun at the ready when he heard a 
suspicious rustling sound outside the house.15 Johnson emerged, and no shot was fired. 
As described in Blaine’s book: “Blaine struggled to regain his composure as the reality of 
what had just happened washed over him. Fourteen hours after losing a president, the nation had 
come chillingly close to losing another one.” Although John McCormack’s name is not 
mentioned in Blaine’s book, a few news stories about the book correctly pointed out that 
McCormack would have become president had Agent Blaine pulled the trigger.16  
Kennedy was the first president to be killed while under Secret Service protection, and 
anxiety levels within the agency grew as public dismay about their inability to protect Kennedy 
led to heightened criticism. 17  Making matters worse was that next-in-line Speaker John 
McCormack sought to cancel Secret Service protection as a violation of his and his wife’s 
personal privacy. While McCormack aide Martin Sweig immediately requested FBI protection 
for his boss, a problem developed.  
As stated in the initial memo written by Cartha DeLoach, the Bureau’s deputy associate 
director:  
Both men, armed, reported to Dr. Sweig at approximately 4:35. I additionally issued 
appropriate instructions to SAC Gillies of the Washington Field Office that there should 
be an around-the-clock surveillance of the Speaker until further notice. . . . I told Agents 
—— and —— and SAC Gillies that if our Agents are challenged at any time by Secret 
service men they should exhibit their credentials and explain to the Secret service men 
that our Agents were present at the specific request of the Speaker’s Office.18 
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The surveillance did not last long. The following day, DeLoach sent another memo to “Mr. 
Mohr”: 
At 11 a.m. this morning, SAC Gillies of the Washington Field Office advised me that our 
Agents are having a somewhat difficult time in carrying out their responsibilities. Mrs. 
McCormack found out through hotel authorities that Metropolitan police were 
maintaining a room down the hall from the Speaker’s suite in the Washington Hotel... 
At 3 a.m. this morning, the Speaker, wearing only his pajama pants and an undershirt, 
visited a public bathroom at the end of the corridor. At approximately 7:45 a.m. this 
morning, the Speaker, after having breakfast in his suite, pushed the breakfast cart down 
the hotel corridor to the room in which the police officer and our Agents were sitting. The 
Speaker suddenly crashed open the door which had been left slightly ajar. He confronted 
our Agents and the police officer and asked them to identify themselves. 
The Agents, acting under our instructions, fully identified themselves and advised the 
Speaker that his office had specifically requested this action. The Speaker indicated his 
appreciation in a very cordial manner. He was very firm, however, in insisting that no 
protection be afforded him.19 
Declaring that “the Nation’s Capital is full of fear and hysteria and he did not want to give 
rise to further feelings in this regard,” McCormack countermanded the request the following day, 
but he could not avoid other humiliations. McCormack valued his privacy and with his 
increasingly frail eighty-year-old wife, Harriet, he wished to minimize any disruptions in the 
well-ordered life they had spent in Washington for thirty-five years, a life so well-ordered that 
they had dinner together every night of their married life. He refused the security detail. 
Former Speaker Jim Wright (D-TX) recalled one last effort to protect McCormack that 
involved Secret Service members dressed as priests who followed the McCormacks on their daily 
rounds. When McCormack discovered the ruse, he exploded and made it clear to President 
Johnson that under the separation of powers he was a legislative officer and not an executive one. 
Even Lyndon Johnson backed off.20 Remarkably, for the fourteen months between November 22, 
1963, and January 20, 1965, when Hubert Humphrey was sworn in as vice president, John 
McCormack, the next-in-line to President Johnson, was unprotected. 
John McCormack was a tough guy, but none of his childhood hardships in the Irish 
tenements of Boston’s Andrew Square prepared him to be a heartbeat away from the White 
House. The fact deeply humbled him. No American in twentieth-century public life had traveled 
as far as John McCormack. With only an eighth-grade public school education, he had overcome 
enormous obstacles to gain his prestigious post. McCormack had no intention of surrendering to 
fear at this time in his life. 
 
The Rotunda Battle 
William Manchester’s monumental but controversial opus The Death of a President captures the 
dramatic tension surrounding the memorial service in the Capitol. Jackie Kennedy’s brother-in-
law Sargent Shriver announced, “Jackie’s decided about tomorrow. She wants [Senate Majority 
Leader Mike] Mansfield to deliver the eulogy in the rotunda.”21 Mrs. Kennedy’s desire that there 
be only one eulogist, and the Senate leader at that, would have excluded the House and Speaker 
McCormack from participating in the service. The House Doorkeeper, William “Fishbait” Miller, 
“flatly told Shriver that Mrs. Kennedy would have to withdraw her request or settle for a 
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compromise.” “That part of the Capitol,” Fishbait explained, “is under the jurisdiction of the 
House.” 
It belongs to the Speaker. If you have any request concerning the rotunda, it will have to 
be made to the Speaker. That’s going to [be] the Congressional part of the funeral, and 
you can’t just walk in and say Mike Mansfield’s going to speak, whatever Jackie’s wish. 
You might hurt the Speaker’s feelings.22 
It is doubtful that Jackie cared one whit about John McCormack’s feelings, but she backed 
off. Whether she made her original request because she wanted no eulogy from John 
McCormack, the factional leader of Jack’s home-state rivals, or because she was simply 
unmindful of Capitol protocol did not matter. John McCormack, the Speaker of the House, would 
be one of the eulogists.  
Two days after the assassination, the nation’s major leaders—House Speaker McCormack, 
Senate Majority Leader Mansfield, and Chief Justice Earl Warren—gathered in the Rotunda of 
the Capitol to eulogize the fallen leader. The speeches produced different reactions. Mansfield 
spoke first, then Warren, and then McCormack. Manchester’s book takes the measure of the three 
speeches and the reactions to them: 
No one criticized McCormack, because he did not say anything, but the Chief Justice’s 
strong denunciation of hatemongering had a mixed reception. Mike Mansfield, however, 
was by far the most controversial of the three. Like Warren, he grasped the essence of the 
Dallas crime—“the bigotry, the hatred, prejudice, and the arrogance which converged in 
that moment of horror to strike him down”—but in its imagery and high diction his 
address was altogether different. It was, indeed, an authentic masterpiece.23 
Mansfield’s was the speech that most moved Jackie. On Tuesday, November 26, the 
president’s casket was laid to rest in the Arlington National Cemetery. Presiding over the 
religious portion of the service was Richard Cardinal Cushing. Cushing, who had presided over 




The 88th Congress was still in session and the nation’s business had to get done. On November 
27, 1963, following five days of official mourning, new president Lyndon B. Johnson appeared 
before a joint session of Congress in the Hall of the US House of Representatives where he had 
once served for twelve years and where Jack Kennedy had served for six.  
Late November days in Washington, DC, are gray, chilly, and dreary, but this one on 
November 27, 1963, was the most somber anyone could remember as Lyndon B. Johnson, the 
newly installed thirty-sixth president of the United States, entered the Hall of the US House of 
Representatives. It was the chamber where the twenty-eight-year-old Johnson began his elective 
career in 1937.  
Johnson was now president. As he stepped to the podium to address a mourning nation and 
an anxious world greatly in need of reassurance, Johnson turned and nodded to the two elderly 
men seated behind him. Over Johnson’s left shoulder was Senator Carl Hayden (D-AZ), the 
president pro tempore of the Senate, and second in line to Johnson. Over Johnson’s right shoulder 
was John McCormack, the Speaker of the House and immediately next in line. Their respective 
order was established in the Succession Act of 1947 that all three men had voted for. 
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At the time of the photograph, Hayden was eighty-six, and McCormack was two weeks away 
from his seventy-second birthday. To disinterested observers of the photograph, Speaker 
McCormack and Senator Hayden seemed to represent the ghosts of “Congress Past.” Their 
longevity in office had enabled them to attain these particular posts, as it had been for most of US 
political history. 
Senator Hayden entered the Congress as Arizona’s first elected US representative in 1912, 
when the state joined the Union as the forty-eighth and final contiguous state. Hayden left the 
House for the Senate in 1927 and served there until 1969, when he retired at the age of ninety-one 
with 56 years and 318 days of continuous service in Congress, the longest in US history at that 
time.25 
Speaker McCormack was first elected to the House in 1928 during the closing days of the 
Coolidge administration and served until 1971, when he retired at the age of seventy-nine at the 
mid-point of President Nixon’s first term. A childhood brush with tuberculosis that had claimed 
the lives of his three grown siblings led to a partially collapsed lung, which gave McCormack a 
gaunt appearance, making him look even older than he was.26 He served with Johnson in the 
House for twelve years, 1937–1949, where they were linked by their mutual association with the 
legendary House Speaker Sam Rayburn. McCormack served dutifully under Rayburn as second-
in-command for twenty-one years, while Johnson called him “my daddy.”27 
Johnson suffered from a well-known heart condition that had kept him out of the 1956 
presidential nominating contest and that would end his life in 1973 at the relatively young age of 
sixty-four. While Johnson’s November 27, 1963, “Let Us Continue” speech sought to reassure 
the nation and the world, the photograph of the men who could succeed him was not reassuring. 
In the caption that appears with the photograph in Michael Beschloss’s compilation of President 
Johnson’s tape recordings, Beschloss observes, “Many Americans were frightened at the sight of 
the two elderly men next in line for the presidency behind LBJ, who had once suffered a massive 
heart attack.”28 
Johnson was well aware of those concerns when he spoke about presidential disability four 
days later on December 1, 1963, with JFK’s White House counsel and chief speechwriter Ted 
Sorensen: 
LBJ: I think we ought to do it pretty soon. . . . Everybody is getting worried and talking 
about it and Mrs. Johnson says she’s had thirty people say, “I looked up there and saw 
those men behind you”—and I’ve got to come home before seven o’clock at night. I know 
these wives will use anything on you, but that’s a sample and you think about what we 
ought to do and give me a page of what you think. 
SORENSEN: The first thing you ought to do is take Mrs. Johnson’s advice and take it 
goddamned easy because that would be a real disaster—with all due respect to the 
Speaker.29 
Since seniority had become inviolable as a guiding principle for congressional advancement, 
it was clear that only elderly members would occupy these two posts. Five of McCormack’s six 
predecessors as Speaker died in office—four between 1931 and 1940.30 Furthermore, only 
thirteen months had passed since the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 had put the nation’s 
survival at risk. Clearly, something had to be done. Unsettled members of Congress introduced 
bills to change the Constitution by adding an amendment to undo the 1947 Succession Act by 
giving Congress the authority to fill the vice presidency when it became vacant. They also sought 
to address the issue of presidential incapacity that had surfaced during President Eisenhower’s 
health crises—his 1955 heart attack and his 1957 stroke.31 
New	England	Journal	of	Public	Policy	
	 8	
The bill gaining the most support was written by Senator Birch Bayh (D-IN), a close friend 
of President Kennedy’s youngest brother, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, whose first 
political victory had been achieved by defeating state attorney general Eddie McCormack, the 
childless Speaker’s younger nephew in the 1962 US Senate Democratic primary.32 In June 1964, 
seven months after the assassination, Senator Bayh and his wife, Marvella, flew to Massachusetts 
with Senator Kennedy to attend the state convention. Hampered by thunderstorms, the low-flying 
plane crashed into a tall tree, causing the deaths of the plane’s pilot, Edwin Zimny, and Edward 
Moss, a Kennedy aide. Senator and Mrs. Bayh, who escaped unharmed, pulled the seriously 
injured Ted Kennedy from the burning plane, fearing that it would explode. Kennedy was spared 
the fate that had claimed the lives of his oldest brother, Joseph P. Kennedy Jr., his sister 
Kathleen, and later, his nephew John Jr. While he escaped death, he was hospitalized for five 
months with broken ribs and a serious back injury.33 The fragility of life weighed heavily on 
Senator Bayh. 
Bayh’s amendment allowed the president to fill the vice presidency with congressional 
approval if it became vacant. To hammer home his point about the necessity of the amendment, 
the fateful 1963 photograph graces the cover of  Bayh’s book One Heartbeat Away.34 The 
message was clear and unequivocal. Neither of these men should become president. 
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified with Nevada’s vote on February 10, 1967, 584 
days after Congress had approved it on July 6, 1965, and sent to the states. The time it took to 
move though the state legislatures was close to the median of other Constitutional amendments. 
The photograph alerted but did not panic the nation. 
With the solution implemented, Senator Hayden was spared further speculation about his 
fitness for the presidency. Speaker McCormack was not so fortunate; he had to endure multiple 
humiliations in its immediate wake and beyond. 
 
The Impact 
While Johnson’s words were heartfelt and moving, the lingering visual of the speech was the 
photograph of the president with two old men, his would-be successors, sitting behind him. It was 
a disquieting image. The critical response to the photograph was but one of the indignities to 
which John McCormack was subjected to during that traumatic week of the transition from 
President Kennedy to President Johnson. 
Johnson was deeply concerned about the succession.35 On December 23, 1963, he sent a 
two-page letter to be co-signed by John McCormack, focusing on the procedures to be followed 
“in the event of my inability to exercise the powers and duties of the Presidency.”36 The wording 
was similar to that of letters between President Eisenhower and Vice President Richard Nixon 
and between President Kennedy and Johnson himself. Should that disability occur, Johnson said 
that “the Speaker of the House would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties 
of the Office until the inability had ended.” Johnson was fearful that his support for the 
amendment might be seen as a “slap at McCormack.”37 While McCormack appreciated the 
passage of the amendment that lifted the burden from his shoulders, he did not appreciate the 
references to his age that aided in its passage. 
Critical editorials include one from the western Massachusetts Berkshire Eagle that asserts: 
“It would not seem amiss for Mr. McCormack to recognize the incongruity of his present 
situation by stepping down as Speaker of the House so that a younger man can be elevated to the 
post which is now, in effect, the Vice Presidency.” When an impertinent reporter asked 
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McCormack if he would do so, he replied: “I was elected Speaker and I am staying Speaker. I’m 
amazed, just amazed that you can ask that. Are there no limits to decency?”38  








While	 those	 opposed	 to	 the	 Trump	 presidency	 believe	 that	 article	 4	 of	 the	 Twenty-Fifth	
Amendment	may	be	used	to	terminate	 it,	 that	article	removes	the	powers	of	 the	presidency	but	 it	
does	 not	 remove	 the	 president	 from	 office.	 The	 powers	 shift	 to	 the	 vice	 president	 as	 “acting	
president.”	 The	 vice	 president	 and	 the	 Cabinet	 must	 agree	 that	 the	 president	 can	 no	 longer	
discharge	the	duties	of	the	office	before	the	matter	is	sent	to	Congress	for	a	vote.	The	president	can	
petition	 Congress,	 contending	 that	 “no	 inability	 exists”	 and	 Congress	 may	 restore	 those	 powers.	
Since	President	Trump	has	already	removed	three	of	the	Cabinet	officers	who	might	have	supported	
such	 a	 move—Secretary	 of	 State	 Rex	 Tillerson,	 Secretary	 of	 Defense	 James	 Mattis,	 and	 Attorney	
General	 Jeff	 Sessions—none	 of	 those	 remaining	 is	 likely	 to	 support	 removal	 of	 his	 powers.	
Furthermore,	with	 fifty-three	Republican	senators	 seated,	 there	will	be	no	 two-thirds	vote	 in	 that	
chamber	to	remove	him,	a	fact	confirmed	by	the	failure	of	the	January	2020	Senate	vote	to	remove	
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